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Ybarra v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 4 (March 3, 2011)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND LAW 
 
 
Summary 
An appeal based on claims of judicial bias.  In addition, an appeal from an order denying 
a motion to strike the death penalty on a claim that Appellant is/was mentally retarded. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
The district court’s orders affirmed.  Defendant’s motion to disqualify lacked merit because no 
reasonable person would question the judge’s impartiality.  Additionally, there was substantial 
evidence to support the denial of Defendant’s motion to strike the death penalty. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 On September 28, 1979, Nancy Griffith (“Griffith”) and a girlfriend met Robert Ybarra 
Jr. (“Ybarra”) in Ely, Nevada.  Ybarra drove the girls around town but eventually dropped the 
girlfriend off, leaving Griffith alone with Ybarra.  Griffith was found the following day clinging 
to life in a desert outside of Ely.  She had been beaten, raped, and set ablaze with gasoline.  She 
died of the injuries shortly thereafter. 
 
 A jury found Ybarra guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, battery with 
intent to commit sexual assault, and sexual assault.  The jury found four aggravating and zero 
mitigating circumstances, and sentenced Ybarra to death on the murder charge and consecutive 
life sentences without the possibility of parole for the remaining offenses.  Ybarra filed three 
post-conviction petitions that the district court  denied.  The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the 
district court’s denial of the petitions. 
 
 In 2002, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment precludes execution of mentally retarded persons.2  Nevada had since 
enacted a statute to address claims by mentally retarded persons sentenced prior to the landmark 
decision.3
 
  Subsequently, on March 6, 2003, Ybarra filed a petition in which he claimed to be 
incompetent to execute.  The district court dismissed the petition on procedural grounds.  The 
Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the issue.  Ybarra then filed a motion to strike 
the death penalty under N.R.S. 175.554(5). 
District court Judge Dobrescu heard the motion.  He disclosed that he had represented 
Griffith’s parents and sister on unrelated matters prior to becoming a judge.  This prompted 
Ybarra to file a motion to disqualify Judge Dobrescu for bias.  The motion was denied by another 
district court judge.  Judge Dobrescu then heard the motion to strike the death penalty.  After a 
two day hearing at which the State and Ybarra presented expert witnesses, the district court 
                                                          
1 By Jennifer DelCarmen 
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554(5) (2007). 
found Ybarra failed to prove his retardation began during the developmental period.  Ybarra 
appealed the denial of the motion to disqualify Judge Dobrescu, claiming it violated his due 
process guarantees.  He also appealed the denial of the motion to strike the death penalty. 
 
Motion to Disqualify  
 
 Ybarra’s motion for disqualification lacked merit because no objective person would 
reasonably question Judge Dobrescu’s impartiality.  Thus, there was no violation of Ybarra’s 
federal or state due process rights.  The Court first addressed Ybarra’s claim that the NCJC 
required disqualification.  The Court found two sections relevant to his claim, namely NCJC, 
Canons 2A and 3E.  The Court pointed out both Canons address the importance of impartiality.  
Both state, explicitly or implicitly, that a judge should disqualify himself if there is an 
appearance of impropriety.  The Court pointed out the test for appearance of impropriety is 
contained in the commentary to NCJC, Canon 2A: “whether the conduct would create in 
reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.”  The Court noted a judge is presumed to be 
impartial.  Thus, the burden of proving bias is on the party asserting the claim.4  The test is 
objective and takes into account all the facts to discover if a reasonable person would harbor 
doubts about impartiality.5  Moreover, the test is a question of law so the Court reviewed it de 
novo.6
 
 
Ybarra tried to argue the notoriety of his case entitled his disqualification motion to 
heightened scrutiny.  However, the Court disagreed; the notoriety of Ybarra’s case did not 
heighten the standard.  Ybarra’s argument would require local judges to recuse themselves in 
every high-profile case tried in the community in which it occurred.  Since judges are presumed 
to be impartial, they will not be disqualified on mere speculation, but only on sufficient factual 
grounds. 
 
The Court also observed that Ybarra’s murder conviction occurred seventeen to nineteen 
years prior to Judge Dobrescu’s representation of any Griffith family member.  Further, the post-
conviction proceedings commenced five to seven years after the end of the professional 
relationship.  Nothing indicated Judge Dobrescu had any continuing obligations to the Griffith 
family.  Consequently, the record contained no evidence Judge Dobrescu has a direct, personal 
interest in Ybarra’s case. 
 
 
Motion to Strike 
 
 Substantial evidence supported the district court’s factual findings, and its legal 
conclusions were not erroneous.  Ybarra failed to produce sufficient evidence of subaverage 
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior deficits before he reached eighteen years of age, 
thus the motion to strike the death penalty was properly decided. 
 
                                                          
4 Goldman v Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 649, 764 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1988). 
5 PETA v. Bobby Berosini Ltd., 111 Nev. 431, 436, 438, 894 P.2d 337, 340-41 (1995). 
6 PETA, 111 Nev. at 437, 894 P.2d at 341. 
 
  Defining “Mental Retardation” 
 
 The Court first pointed out that the United States Supreme Court, while banning the 
execution of mentally retarded individuals, never defined mental retardation or set forth 
procedures for enforcement, instead leaving the task to the states.7  The Nevada Legislature 
responded by enacting statutes not only defining “mental retardation,” but also stating the 
procedures to be followed.  Upon a motion by the defendant, the court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing to determine if the defendant is mentally retarded.8  The defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded.9  The legislature defined “mentally 
retarded” as “significant subaverage general intelligence functioning which exists concurrently 
with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the development period”.10
 
  
The Court had never previously interpreted the statute’s definition of “mentally retarded”  
and thus decided to do so before examining the district court’s decision.  The Court first pointed 
out the definition of ‘mentally retarded’ in the current statute was taken from a prior Nevada 
statute.11
 
  The prior statutory definition conformed to the clinical definitions espoused by the 
American Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) and the American Psychiatric 
Association (“APA”).  The definition can be broken down into three conjunctive elements: (1) 
significant limitations in intellectual functioning; (2) significant limitation in adaptive function; 
and (3) age of onset.  Both associations limited the onset age to eighteen years of age.  Since the 
statutory definition of “mentally retarded” and the associations’ definitions were similar, the 
Court decided the associations could provide useful guidance in applying N.R.S. 174.098. 
The Court then looked at how to measure significant limitations in intellectual 
functioning.  An IQ score typically measures intellectual functioning.  Clinical definitions 
indicate that persons with an IQ between seventy to seventy-five points are mentally retarded.12
 
  
However, a person could also use evidence of school or other records to prove a significant 
limitation. 
In addition to proving a subaverage intellectual functioning, a defendant must also 
demonstrate significant deficits in adaptive behavior.  Without adaptive behavior problems, a 
person would not be considered mentally retarded,13
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 thus the interplay between intellectual 
functioning and adaptive behavior is critical.  The Court then relied on other states’ case law and 
medical definitions to implicitly accept the definition of adaptive behavior to be a “collection of 
conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been learned by people in order to function in 
8 NEV .REV .STAT. 174.098(1) & (2); N.R.S. 175.554(5) (2007). 
9 NEV. REV. STAT. 174.098(5)(b) (2007). 
10 NEV. REV. STAT. 174.098(7) (2007). 
11 NEV. REV. STAT. 433.174 (2007). 
12 State v. Vela, 777 N.W.2d 266, 294 (Neb. 2010); State v. McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 785 (Ind. 2007); Ex Parte 
Briseno, 135 S.W. 3d 1, 7, n.24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000). 
13 Meyers v. State, 130 P.3d 262, 268 (Okla. Crim App. 2005); Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500, 504 (Ga. 1991) 
quoting DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 37 (3rd ed. 1980). 
their everyday lives [and thus] limitations on adaptive behavior are ordinarily reflected by 
difficulties adjusting to ordinary demands made in daily life.”14
 
 
The final element the defendant must prove is the age of onset; that is, both of the first 
two elements occurred prior to a certain age.  Since the statute refers to age of onset as the 
“developmental period,”15
 
  the Court next considered what the exact age of onset is.  The Court 
examined the two purposes behind the requirement: (1) to differentiate between retardation and 
brain injuries that occur later and (2) to prevent criminals from faking retardation once facing 
capital punishment.  The Court then pointed out both that the AAMR and the APA, as well as 
approximately half of the states expressly focus on the age of eighteen as the onset age.  Further, 
the Court observed that some states  simply have “developmental period” in their statutes, while 
others that have defined the term use the age of eighteen as the required age of onset.  The Court 
then concluded “developmental period” means prior to reaching eighteen years of age.  Thus, a 
defendant must prove subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior deficits 
originated before age eighteen. 
Standard of Review 
 
Having fully explained the elements, the Court next addressed the proper standard of 
review when reviewing a district court decision regarding mental retardation on appeal.  The 
Court noted states have used a variety of standards - abuse of discretion, clear error, or a 
combination of the two.  The Court decided the determination of whether a defendant is mentally 
retarded is based on factual conclusions, but also requires legal analysis to determine whether the 
elements have been proven.  Hence, the Court reviewed the district court’s decision as a mixed 
question of law and fact.  The district court’s factual findings received deference as long as they 
were supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.  The district court’s credibility 
determinations also receive deference.  However, the Court proclaimed it would review the legal 
consequences of the district court’s factual findings de novo. 
 
Evidence Adduced at the District Court Level 
 
In a twenty-two day hearing, the district court reviewed mounds of evidence, three 
experts’ testimony, and 3,000 pages of records, which the Court then summarized.  Ybarra was 
the oldest of five children.  At the age of sixteen, he  transferred to an alternative school where 
he received his adult diploma at eighteen.  Ybarra was plagued with drug and alcohol problems 
beginning in his teens.  He enlisted in the Marine Corps twice, but was discharged for 
homosexual conduct and fraudulent enlistment respectively. Ybarra then enlisted in the National 
Guard, which later discharged him due to asthma.  Doctors diagnosed Ybarra with several mental 
conditions, including delusions and hallucinations, organic personality disorder, and bipolar 
disorder.  At the age of twenty-five Ybarra married, but the marriage ended within a few months.  
 
Ybarra’s first expert, Dr. Schmidt, interviewed and tested Ybarra in 2001 and 2002, and 
when considering his background, found Ybarra was/is mentally retarded.  He defined the 
mentally retarded range as an IQ score ranging from seventy to seventy-five.  He administered an 
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IQ test on which Ybarra scored sixty, placing him in the mentally retarded range.16
 
   Further, the 
expert explained Ybarra’s health and school records also indicated low intellectual functioning.  
Dr. Schmidt relied on a slew of evidentiary records, such as the psychiatric evaluation 
that Ybarra underwent prior to the age of eighteen, which diagnosed him as intellectually 
challenged.  Dr. Schmidt also pointed to a head injury Ybarra received when he was nine years 
old which led to headaches and abnormal electroencephalogram tests.  Dr Schmidt claimed the 
mental illness stemmed from the injury and changed the course of Ybarra’s development, driving 
him into the range of mental retardation.  
 
In support of Ybarra’s claimed deficits in adaptive behavior, Dr. Schmidt pointed to 
Ybarra’s school and employment records.  Ybarra’s inability to participate in sports, get along 
with his classmates, and his transfer to an alternative school  all evidenced his deficits in 
adaptive behavior.  In adulthood  Ybarra could not maintain steady employment and relied on 
family and friends to obtain work, was in and out of the military, had never lived independently 
of other people, and became lost (in his own town) easily.  Dr. Schmidt further claimed that 
Ybarra’s consistent reliance on family and friends masked his deficits because it prompted them 
to assist him in adapting. 
 
Ybarra’s second expert, Dr. M. Young, also relied on interviews and tests to conclude 
Ybarra was/is mentally retarded.  Dr. M. Young administered a Street Survival Skills 
Questionnaire to Ybarra and claimed he could translate the results into an IQ score.17
 
  Ybarra 
scored a seventy-nine, which placed him in the borderline range of mental retardation.  Dr. 
Young relied on observations of prior professionals who evaluated Ybarra.  These professionals 
claimed Ybarra became overwhelmed, agitated, and avoidant when over stimulated and was 
unable to cope with complex problems.  According to Dr. M. Young, such behavior indicated 
limited adaptive skills. 
The State’s expert, Dr. T Young, also interviewed and tested Ybarra, but  concluded 
Ybarra manipulated the tests and thus could not interpret the results.  On the first test, an IQ test, 
Ybarra scored a sixty-six, placing him in the mentally retarded range.  However, Dr. T. Young 
also administered a memory test and concluded the result showed malingering.  This caused Dr. 
T. Young to question the accuracy of the tests performed by the defense’s experts.  He ultimately 
concluded no valid IQ test results had ever been obtained from Ybarra.  In addition, no defense 
expert tested Ybarra for malingering.  Finally, Dr. T. Young concluded Ybarra’s problems at 
school stemmed from  drug alcohol and drug abuse. 
 
Prior to his motion for post conviction relief, Ybarra had taken an IQ test in 1981 and 
scored an eighty-six (outside the range of mental retardation).  However, Dr. Schmidt suggested 
the test might have been scored inaccurately.  Dr. Schmidt further opined that even if the score 
was accurate, the Flynn effect could have inflated it by as much as fifteen points.  The Flynn 
effect is a line of studies suggesting that IQ scores gradually increase over time until the test is 
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to the stress caused by the test. 
17 The test measures adaptive skills. 
re-normed.18
 
  If adjusted to account for the Flynn effect,  Ybarra’s score would fall into the 
mentally retarded range. 
School, medical, military, and employment records also provided conflicting assessments 
of Ybarra’s intellectual functioning.  Ybarra’s seventh grade teacher described him as an average 
student who could have performed better if he tried harder.  Dr. Schmidt dismissed this statement 
because it was based on events that occurred over thirty-five years prior.  Some mental health 
experts who examined Ybarra and found him to be of below average intellectual functioning 
with an IQ between seventy to eighty points.  Other mental health professionals claimed Ybarra 
was faking  his purported mental disorders.  Ybarra’s military records described him as “dull 
normal” and Dr. Schmidt conceded that is not within the range of mental retardation.  In 
addition, Ybarra was employed for lengthy periods, earning salaries well above the minimum 
wage. 
 
The district court also analyzed letters Ybarra wrote in prison and concluded they 
indicated Ybarra was not mentally retarded.  Defense experts countered that the court could not 
use the letters  as evidence of mental retardation because Ybarra might have received assistance 
in drafting them from other inmates. 
 
 Analysis of the District Court’s Determinations: 
 
Ybarra challenged the district court’s determination that he did not demonstrate 
subaverage intellectual functioning during the developmental period.  Ybarra claimed the district 
court erroneously focused on the 1981 IQ test to the exclusion of the IQ test administered by Dr. 
Schmidt.  Further, Ybarra claimed the district court erroneously relied on the tests administered 
by Dr. T. Young.  
 
Ybarra pointed out that using the Flynn effect would put his 1981 IQ test score in the 
range of mental retardation.  However, the Court noted whether scores should be adjusted to 
account for the Flynn effect  is greatly disputed in many jurisdictions.  The Court then refused to 
take a position on the validity of the Flynn effect because it was unnecessary.  
 
The Court pointed out that while not accepting the Flynn effect as scientifically valid, the 
district court did lower the score based on the Flynn effect, to seventy-eight, yet Ybarra still fell 
outside the mentally retarded range.  The district court used an adjustment rate of .31 per year, 
which is consistent with other courts adjustments,19
 
 instead of a reduction by fifteen points as Dr. 
Schmidt suggested was proper.  The Court concluded the adjustment rate had a foundation and 
was a valid method.  In addition, the Court declared 1981 IQ test to be of little value because 
Ybarra took it after he was eighteen years old. 
Further, the district court did not merely rely on the 1981 IQ test to determine Ybarra 
failed to prove he suffers from significant subaverage intellectual functioning.  Rather, the 
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19 Witt v. State, 938, N.E.2d 1193, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Bowling v. Commissioner, 163 S.W.3d, 361, 374 (Ky. 
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district court looked at the evidence as a whole, including the various records, Ybarra’s letters, 
and evidence of malingering. 
 
The Court also found the district courts reliance on Dr. T. Young’s testimony valid and 
supported by other evidence in the record.  The district court found the IQ tests administered by 
Dr. T. Young to be invalid.  It  instead focused on the memory test Dr. T. Young administered 
which demonstrated that Ybarra was faking mental retardation.  Ybarra pointed to evidence that 
the test was not meant to be used on mentally retarded persons, and occasionally yielded false-
positives.  However, the Court pointed out that other mental health experts concurred that Ybarra 
feigned other mental diseases.  Further, the district court also relied on the letters written by 
Ybarra while in jail to add credence to the determination Ybarra was malingering.  However, the 
Court again clarified that the memory test, administered after Ybarra reached eighteen years of 
age, is of little value anyway.  
 
Ybarra also challenged the district court’s determination that he did not have adaptive 
behavior deficits.  He claimed the district court improperly disregarded evidence.  Ybarra further 
claimed the district court relied on its own lay opinions, which were contrary to the evidence. 
The Court found the district court did not improperly disregard the evidence.  Rather, the district 
court simply found the defense experts’ testimony to lack credibility.  While both Dr. M. Young 
and Dr. Schmidt opined Ybarra exhibited adaptive behavior deficits, contrary evidence existed in 
the record.  The Court concluded the district court was in the best position to make such 
credibility determinations.  
 
Ybarra also claimed the district court ignored evidence showing he had adaptive behavior 
deficits.  Ybarra claimed the district court ignored evidence that he cannot navigate his 
hometown, had only held menial jobs, had problems in school, had a short, unsuccessful 
marriage, relied on his inmates, and the testimony of one psychiatrist who stated at age fifteen 
Ybarra reached his emotional and intellectual potential.  In addition, Ybarra alleged the district 
court put too much weight on the evidence indicating malingering.  
 
However, the Court found evidence conflicting Ybarra on all matters.  It again  gave 
great deference to the the district court’s credibility determinations regarding Ybarra and his 
experts.   The Court found that the district court relied on the evidence as a whole.  The Court 
approved of the district court’s inferences from the evidence of Ybarra’s military service, his 
drug and alcohol abuse, his work record, his letters, and his ability to live independently and 
travel showed Ybarra did not have adaptive behavior deficits. 
 
 Further, the Court found the district court did not rely heavily on malingering in deciding 
Ybarra lacked adaptive behavior deficits.  Instead, the district court used evidence of malingering 
to determine Ybarra did not demonstrate subaverage intellectual functioning.  The district court 
expressly acknowledged that evidence of malingering alone would not be enough to prove 
Ybarra was not mentally retarded.  The Court ultimately declared the district court based any 
reliance on evidence of malingering on substantial evidence. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 A judge should recuse himself from a criminal case if there is an appearance of 
impropriety.  To prevail on a motion to disqualify, defendants must prove a reasonable, objective 
person would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.  A mere prior professional 
relationship between a judge and the victim’s family, without more, is not enough to support 
such a motion. 
 
To prevail on a motion to strike the death penalty on the basis of mental retardation, a 
defendant must prove: (1) significant limitations in intellectual functioning; (2) significant 
limitation in adaptive function; and that (3) both appeared in the developmental stages.  The 
“developmental stage” refers to the period before a person reaches eighteen years of age.  The 
Nevada Supreme Court reviews motions to strike the death penalty as a mixed question of law 
and fact, giving deference to the district court’s credibility determinations.  
